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INDIANA DIVORCES.
The laws of Indiana are not more favorable to ex parte divorces than are those of some other States. At one time
probably they were;' and this circumstance, and the accidental
notoriety of some instances in which individuals have obtained
divorces in the courts of Indiana, have given rise to an impres.
sion that the marriage relation is more easily sundered in that
State than elsewhere. The impression is not well founded;
this much, however, is true, that Indiana is one of a number of
the States of the Union in which a legal dissolution of a marriage may be obtained for a variety of causes besides absolute
marital unfaithfulness, and by means of proceedings which do
not always involve notice that they are in progress, to the party
to beaffected. Weproposeto take the divorce laws of Indiana
as a representative or type of the systems of legislation prevailing in many jurisdictions on the subject of divorce, with a
view of explaining the legal principles on which the validity
and operation of a decree obtained in one State is to be determined when it is presented in the courts of another.2
1 There was a period during which no preLiom residence was required from
a petitioner for divorce in Indiana; residence at the time of applying was
enough; and this gave great facility to applicants from other States. Now,
however, a previous bonafide residence of a year is requisite.
2 We draw most of the illustrations and citations contained In this article
from Abbott's Indiana Digest, tit. Divorce, in which the author has appended
a note presenting the adjudications in the other States, upon the effect ot
Indiana Judgments, when drawn in question outside the bounds of the State.
(721)
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By the present law of Indiana a petition for divorce may
be filed by any person, who, at the time of filing such petition,
shall have been a bonafide resident of the State one year previous to the filing of the same, and a resident of the county at
the time of the filing such petition. Such bonafide residence
must be duly proved to the satisfaction of the court: 2 Rev.
stat. 231, sect. 6; as amended, Sess. Acts 1859, 108, sect. 1;
same stat. 2 Gay. & H. 350.
Divorces may be decreed upon the application of.the injure
party-for the following causes:
1. Adultery; with exception of cases where defense of connivance, condonation, or recrimination, is established.
2. "Impotency."
3. "Abandonment for one year."
4. "Cruel treatment of either party by the other."
5. "Habitual drunkenness of either party, or the failure of
the husband to make reasonable provisions for his family."
6. Conviction of infamous crime.
7. "Any other cause for which the court shall deem it
proper that a divorce should be granted": Id. sec. 7.
If it appear "by the a iMdavit of a disinterested person, or
by the return of the officer" ... "that the defendant is not a
resident of this State," the clerk of the court is required to give
notice of the pendency of the petition by publication for three
weeks in a weekly newspaper, etc.: Id. sec. 11.
No decree of divorce can be rendered on default without
proof: I- sec. 13. And,. whenever a petition for divorce
remains undefended, it is the duty of the public prosecuting
attorney to appear and resist the proceeding:' Id. sec. 27.
1 This provision rests upon the ground that the government of the State
is interested in the proceedings, so far asto take precautionagainst the obtain.
ing divorces by coll4sion. It can only have been passed because the State ba
some interest in the status of the citizen; because persons not before the court
will be affected by its aetion in the premises; because public policy requires
that government shall exercise some control in reference to this relation in
life: Scott
v. cot, 17 Ind. 09.
But the omission of the prosecuting attorney to interpose a defense, is not a
ground for reversing a judgment of divorce otherwise regular. The statute
directs him to appear; but it does not say the court shall not proceed if he fa ls
to appear: Green v. Green,7 ld.
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The distinction recognized in several of the States between
divorces a vinculo and those a mnensa et thoro, is not main-

tained in Indiana; noris the restriction of the marriage relation
continued as respects the party for whose fault the dissolution
is decreed. But the divorce of one party fully dissolves the
marriage contract as to both :' 2 Gay. & H. 350, sect. 23.
When a divorce has been obtained under these provisions,
without other notice to the defendant than publication in a
newspaper, the defendant may, for proper cause shown, have
the judgment opened so far as relates to the children or to
the allowance of alimony and the disposal of Property; but
the dissolution of the marriage cannot be reconsidered.

The power of the legislature of the State to prescribe these
grounds and methods of divorce has been seriously and candidly considered, so far as respects the validity and operation
of the judgment within the State, in a number of cases. One
objection urged has been that marriage is a contract, and as
such is protected against State legislation by the Constitution
of the United States. But it is held that the prohibition of
laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not prohibit the
States from passing general laws authorizing divorces, if they
do not pass beyond the rights of their own citizens and act
upon the rights of citizens of other States: Tolen v. Tolen 2
Blackf. 407. Clearly, the marriage relation ought to be distinguished from ordinary contracts. Some confusion has arisen
from confounding the contract to marry with the marriage
relation itself. And still more is engendered by regarding
husband and wife as strictly parties to a subsisting contract.
At common law, marriage, as a status, had few elements of
contract about it. For instance, no other contract merged the
existence of the parties into one. Other distinctive elements
1 This gtatute has abolished, for Indiana, the common law divorce a mensa
et thoro, and has substituted therefor a total dissolution of the marriage con.
tract, and a restoration of the parties to their respective rights, at'least as to
their fature conduct and relations, as though the marriage had never existed.
It is, in legal effect, a divorce a tinculo matrimonit, and either party, upon its
rendition, is at liberty to enter into a new marriage contract. the statute has
shus radically changed the whole policy of the law in regard to divorces:

Maer v. CMark, 23 Ind. 370.
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will readily suggest themselves, which rob it of most of. its
characteristics as a contract, and leave it simply as a status or
institution. As such it is not so much the result of private
agreement as of public ordination. In this light, marriage is
more than a contract; it is a great public institution, giving
character to the whole civil polity. Hence, as between husband and wife, there is no constitutional provision protecting
the marriage from legislative control, by general laws, upon
such terms as public policy may require. The sovereign power
may, by general enactment, regulate and mould their relative
rights and duties at pleasure. Moreover, the practice of the
country has determined that marriage is not a contract within
the provision of the national Constitution. The power to
authorize divorces, by either general or special laws, has been
exercised by nearly all the States too extensively to allow tut
it should now be questioned: Noel v. Ewing 9 Ind. 37.
These views correspond with those which have been taken
by the courts of othet States upon the same question. The
general power of a State to legislate upon the subject of divorce within its own borders, to prescribe grounds upon
which a divorce may be granted, and proceedings by which
i may be obtained, is firmly settled.
Nor can it well be denied that this power may be exercised
within the discretion of the legislature as toward persons who
come to reside in the State from abroad. The power to grant
a divorce cannot be confined to persons whose marriages were
solemnized in the State. The right to a divorce, both as respects the grounds and the modes of procedure, is governead by
the law of the domicil, and not by that of the place of the contract. To redress the violation of the duties of the marriage
state belongs to the laws of the country where the parties reside. There is nothing in the will of the parties that gives the
lex loci any particular force over the marriage contract, or that
impedes the course of the ju8 publicum in relation to it.
Other contracts are modified by the will of the parties, and the
7,x oci becomes essential; but not so with matrimonial rights
and duties. They cannot be dissolved by the will of the parties.
Elence it is not necessary that a foreigner. should have ac-
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quired a domicil animo remanendi; the law of the country at
once applies its own rules to all domestic relations, otherwise
a numerous description of persons would be permitted to violate with impunity the obligations of domestic life: Toen v.
Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407; 2 Kent's Comm. 115. Hence it is competent to a State to authorize its courts to entertain the petition of one who, in good faith, removes his residence within
the State. The desire to avail oneself of the benefits of the law
ofthejurisdiction is often aleadingmotive in inducing a change
of residence; and no State would concede that such motive
should be condemned. A fraudulent, pretended or collusive
change of residence will always be detected, if practicable;
and when detected, the party will not be permitted io gain advantage by the removal. But one who removes, in good faith,
into a State, for the purpose of taking the benefit of its laws
adapted to promote his interest, cannot very well be debarred
by that State from the benefits of them on any such ground as that he came with that intention.
But the question-what effect must be given in otherjurisdictions to a divorce granted under such a system of provsions
as is above described, involves new considerations. In New
York an absolute divorce is obtainable for adultery only. In
Indiana, it may be obtained for any cause which the court may

deem proper; upon a year's residence only; and by means of
a brief and obscure publication of summons. Granting that
the courts of Indiana may, and must decree a divorce to a
citizen of New York, who acquires the residence, shows the
cause, and takes the proceedings prescribed by the statute,
and that such divorce must determine the status of the parties
to the marriage everywhere within Indiana,does it follow
that the courts of New York, upon a subsequent return of the
petitioner within their jurisdiction, must yield to and enforce
within that State a decree which never could have been obtained by original proceedings within those courts? Does
the comity of States require this ? Does the constitutional
provision in favor of the judgments of other States impose
such an obligation?
The numerous decisions upon this vexed and difficult ques
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tion will be found upon the whole, to sustain the following
rules:
1. Where the defendant appears or is personally served
with process for the commencement of a suit, a judgment of
divorce granted by the courts of one State, and valid upon its
face according to the local law, is operative in every other
State of the Union.' It cannot be gainsaid in another State
on the ground that the cause of divorce assigned is not sufficient; that the charges against the defendant were not proved;
or canbe disproved; or that the decree was improperly granted.
The Constitution obliges the courts of each State to give "full
faith and credit," to a judgment of divorce predicated upon
appearance or actual service.
This is indeed the general rule as to judgments of other
descriptions. And it is specifically sustained and applied to
divorces, in the recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Cherner v. Wilson 9 Wall. 108. The facts in that
case were, that a husband and wife, not residing in Indiana,
separated, being unable to agree; and some years after the
separation the wife went to Indiana, where in a few months
she obtained a divorce, in an action in which the husband
appeared, and soon after left the State. The decree of divorce
adjudged that a portion of the rents of certain real estate in
the city of Washington, district of Columbia, should be paid
to the husband for the support of two of the children, who
were assigned to his care. The wife entered into an agreement
to perform this provision of the decree, but subsequently refused to do so, and the husbandfiled a bill in the Circuit Court
of the district to enforce it. The Circuit Court dismissed the
bill holding the decree of divorce was "wholly void as to each
of the subjects of which it claimed to dispose-the divorce,
the children, and the property." On appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, that tribunal held that the decree
was valid. The court granting it, acquired jurisdiction of the
parties by the husband's appearing without raising the quesiWe speak throughout of the effect of the divorce upon the personal swus
of the parties. Marital rights in real property may be dependent upon the law
of the place where the property lies, so as to call for a different rule.
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tion of residence. The decree was, therefore, conclusive upou
the parties to the suit; and as it was valid by the laws of
Indiana, and had never been questioned there, it must, under
the Constitution of the United States, prevail in every other
portion of the country.
This decision may not, indeed, in express terms, cover cases
in which the judgment is predicated upon personal service of
process, not on voluntary appearance, but the general course
of decision upon the effect, under the Constitution, of State
judgments, irrespective of the nature of the cause of action,
together with the language of many of the decisions upon the
effect of divorces, authorize that description of cases be included in the rule in the text. See Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I.
87. Compare also, Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray 157; in which it
was held, that a decree of divorce a vinculo, obtained in another State, between parties residing in Massachusetts, for a
cause which would not have been cause for such a divorce in
Massachusetts, and by a party who went to another State for
the purpose of obtaining it, is void in Massachusetts, even if
the other party appear and answer.
2. Where, however, a citizen of one State resorts to another
State for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, upon grounds for
which it would not be granted in the State of original residence,
bringing himself within the new jurisdiction by a fraudulent
or simulated residence, and institutes proceedings by mere publication of process, no personal service or actual appearance
being made, the courts of the State of original residence are at
liberty to disregard the judgment as obtained in fraud of their
laws, and void: Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Bradshaw
v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; ,YcGiffert v. JfceGffert, 31 Barb.

69; 17 How. Pr. 18; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227;
Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray 157. The courts are at liberty to disregard it; they are not bound to do so. See Thompson v.
State, 28 Ala. 12. It does not dissolve the marriage, nor
authorize the plaintiff to remarry in the latter State: Vischer
v. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; even so far as to render the spouse
in the second marriage an in~ompetent witness for such plaintiff- People v. If- CranT., 6 Park. Cr. 49 ; nor form a defense

